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Abstract 
This article attempts a search for economic, sociological and even psychological answers about the 
foundations of individual’s prosocial behavior with a focus on economic incentives and social norms. 
First, we present an evidence-based approach of individual’s prosocial behavior using the justification 
and the economies of worth of Boltanski and Thevenot (2006). After that, we analyze a prosocial 
behavior applied to the process of maturity repayment of individual loans. We propose two different 
methods to check the theoretical propositions: logit and probit method in one hand and fractional 
method of Papke and Wooldridge (1996) in other hand. The logit and probit method are estimated in 
the aim of better understanding of the influencing factors of the maturity repayment behavior of 
borrowers. Estimation of fractional method helps to learn about the probability of delinquency in loan 
repayment. The results attest the theoretical propositions. 
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1. Introduction 
Both economic incentives and social norms influence individual behavior. Many authors including 
Nobel Prizes have shed light on this matter by providing excellent works specifically relating to 
behavioral economics (Note 1). The rational choice school of sociologists also recognizes the joint 
influence of social norms and economic incentives (Lindbeck et al., 1999). While economists have 
focused on economic incentives, sociologists have emphasized social norms. 
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Prosocial activities represent a substantial part of social life, including such actions as donating money 
for a cause or an organization, volunteering for a party during election times, voting, cleaning beaches, 
donating blood, etc. (Lacetera & Macis, 2010).  
Understanding what motivates individuals to contribute to prosocial activities emerges, therefore, as a 
topic of increasing interest in economics as well as sociology and even psychology. The issue is made 
all the more pressing by the fact that, for many of these activities, supply is often below societal needs.  
However, individuals might simply not ﬁnd it worthwhile to engage in prosocial activities if the 
beneﬁts fall short of the opportunity costs. If this is the case, then material incentives (composed of 
material cash-incentives also called explicit economic incentives, and material non-cash incentives) 
might be effective in increasing the number and frequency of prosocial acts. But, a large common idea 
is that, explicit economic incentives designed to increase contributions to public goods and to promote 
other prosocial behavior sometimes are counterproductive or less effective than would be predicted 
among entirely self-interested individuals. This may occur when incentives adversely affect 
individuals’ altruism, ethical norms and intrinsic motives (Bowles & Polanía-Reyes, 2012).  
Bénabou and Tirole (2006) enlightened this issue in their study of incentives and prosocial behavior 
and provided convincing answers which defined extrinsic incentives given by the society and the 
intrinsic incentives providing from personal motivation. They develop a theory of prosocial behavior 
that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or 
self-respect.  
To understand what kind of incentives might encourage prosocial behavior, however, one must ﬁrst 
have an understanding of the motives behind altruistic behavior. In fact, recent empirical and 
theoretical contributions suggest that depending on what motivates individuals to contribute to 
prosocial causes, certain types of material incentives might backﬁre (Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; 
Ryan & Deci, 2000; Lacetera & Macis, 2010).  
In addition, the effect of economic incentives and social norms in shaping of prosocial behaviors of 
individuals is explained in a sociological approach based on the theory of reciprocity that defines 
reciprocal behavior as a social preference (Simpson & Willer, 2008).  
Although there are several types of social preferences in the literature, Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) 
provide the most common characteristics of social preferences. Particularly important types of social 
preferences are the reciprocal fairness (not driven by the expectation of future material benefit), the 
inequity aversion, pure and impure altruism; and self-identity preferences. In short, the sociological 
approach of prosocial behavior focus on three sets of theories addressing non‐selfish motives or 
“other‐regarding” behavior, namely: (1) the outcome‐based prosocial preferences theories (inequity 
aversion, pure and impure altruism) that assume that an individual’s utility depends directly on the 
utility of other people; (2) the theories of reciprocity (or conditional cooperation) that are based on the 
notion that individuals behave in a friendly manner when they are treated benevolently and, conversely, 
they act meanly when treated badly; and (3) the approaches stressing the importance of self‐identity for 
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prosocial behavior. These theoretical frameworks are relevantly interpreted by Boltanski and Thevenot 
(2006) for better understand how actors can justify their behaviors using contradictory foundations. 
This article requires a search for economic, sociological and even psychological answers about the 
foundations of individual’s prosocial behavior with a focus on economic incentives and social norms. 
So the study combines economic theories and sociologic approach of prosocial behavior using field 
experiment. An illustration is provided using the maturity repayment behavior of loans in a specific 
context.  
We propose a socioeconomic framework that clearly introduce to the understanding of the borrower’s 
prosocial behavior regarding maturity repayment. Then, an empirical illustration of the theoretical 
propositions is given, based on a survey data. 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an evidence-based approach of individual’s 
prosocial behavior based on the justification and the economies of worth of Boltanski and Thevenot. 
Section 3 proposes the empirical evidence with different methods (logit, probit and fractional) used to 
check the theoretical propositions and provides results interpretation. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Evidence-Based Framework of Prosocial Behavior 
2.1 Context and Issues 
The study applies to the context in which a debt relationship exists between a lending institution 
represented by a credit manager and a borrower. The prosocial behavior being studied is the maturity 
repayment behavior of credit in microfinance institutions. Indeed, in Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) 
in West Africa, lending contracts are often drawn up taking into account the borrower’s relationships 
with third parties, whether the borrower is in liability group lending or whether he is in individual 
lending (Besley, 1995). Individual lending is most concerned with endorsement and sponsorship 
relationships, which are known as non-market institutions applied for loans, Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Relationship within Individual Lending 
 
The endorsement and sponsorship practices are formalized as supervisory mechanism for better project 
selecting and monitoring of borrowers within lending contracts (Kamalan, 2018). The endorsement 
practice refers to relationships between an individual borrower who does not have personal material 
collateral and the third party, the endorser. The latter is usually a person close to the borrower, for 
example the spouse or member of the family lineage. The endorser provides a material asset as a 
collateral in return to the debt the borrower receives. The endorsement relationship engages the 
endorser to have the same level of commitment as the joint liability relationship.  
The sponsorship is similar to the moral assistance that generally involves a testimonial process. It 
consists in the fact that, the third party close relative of the borrower, testifies the good probity and 
exemplary morality of the borrower in order to dispel any doubt that may remain with a credit manager 
(in a lending institution) when examining the borrower’s loan application. In contrast to the endorser, 
the sponsor is simply a moral guarantor who commits his moral honor for the benefit of the borrower 
by testifying in his behalf. The sponsor makes himself available to the lending institution for assistance 
in recovering the assets, as long as the borrower does not fulfil his commitments.  
If the endorser or the sponsor is not a borrower himself, he does not derive any direct benefit from his 
act; that is to be considered as a pure altruism. The main interest of endorser or sponsor is to assist the 
borrower in the credit application. Endorser and sponsor may be satisfied with offering an opportunity 
to a family member for whom they feel morally indebted because of first-born obligation for example.  
In several cases, borrowers engaged in relationships with third parties such as joint borrowers in 
liability group have been known for having better loan repayment behavior (Armendáriz-de-Aghion & 
Gollier, 2000). This behavior for loan repayment is all time explained by the social pressure of the 
group members who want the credit to be granted repeatedly to each one in turn. But, the social 
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pressure is less effective and often inactive or counterproductive when the borrower has relationships 
with third parties who are not engaged in the same lending or who are outside the lending institution. 
This is the case for sponsorship and endorsement relationships. In this case, the design of lending 
contract and the repayment behavior must be analyzed using another prism: the prosocial behavior. 
Answering the questions raised by the use of sponsorship and endorsement relationships within lending 
relationships, an interesting approach is provided by the theory of social capital originally defended by 
P. Bourdieu, J-C. Coleman and R. Putnam. Putnam’s approach, in contrast to the Bourdieusian ones, 
provides a framework of social capital that makes social ties an essential endowment of a society. This 
feature makes resources available to members to be active within the functioning of the society. Putnam 
believes that a society can potentially have a significant endowment of social capital in the form of 
trust, reciprocity norms and civic engagement networks, for to facilitate voluntary cooperation between 
individuals in the sense of collaboration, knowledge pooling, skills and efforts sharing. This approach 
of social capital is closely in line with the early work of institutional economics. 
Therefore, sponsorship and endorsement relationships are considered as societal attributes rather than 
individual assets. A problem is to effectively engage the attributes of a society and make them interact 
in the meaningful behavior of an individual, as observed in the lending relationship. It is clear that the 
individual’s aim is to maximize earnings and expectations. Consequently, it will be asked to determine 
the process to be use to resolve conflicts between the collective aspirations of society induced by 
societal attributes and the rational expectations of individuals motivated by selfish interests. These 
issues are strongly addressed by Boltanski and Thevenot (2006) in their analysis of justification and the 
economies of worth. 
2.2 Evidence-Based Practices that Shape Behavior 
To better understanding the sponsorship and endorsement relationships within lending contracts and the 
connection to the economies of worth developed by Boltanski and Thevenot, we consider the sense of 
credit and the effects on behavior shaping. That opens up a normative dimension of the reasoning about 
the meaning of the lending for the actors involved, as stakeholders of the lending contract; particularly 
for the borrower. That’s the justification of the behavior based on the foundations basically called 
“values”, Kamalan (2019). We’ve matched the economies of worth of Boltanski and Thevenot with the 
values highlighted by the sponsorship and endorsement relationships, Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Foundations of Values Highlighted by Sponsorship and Endorsement 
 
Let’s only consider the cities of market, fame and inspiration defined by Boltanski and Thevenot (Note 
2). Boltanski and Thevenot defined the city of “market” that uses competition as a greatness. This city 
highlights the personal advantages of the actor (the borrower) whose interests are freed from domestic 
and civic considerations. The link is no longer synonymous with identity filiation, but refers to a 
consumerist attachment. In this context, the borrower’s desirable behavior is to be sought in the 
self-determination and self-sacrifice in preserving the financial relationship with the lending institution, 
no matter the costs and effort to be expended. Value takes on a sense of competence. Borrower is 
valuable because he or she is capable. The value of competency is all the more sought if it is rewarded. 
The credit renewal willingness with higher amount is one of the best tool used to test the impact of 
competency on maturity repayment behavior. That is defined as an economic material incentive. 
In the city of “industry”, greatness is revealed in a form of the individual’s effectiveness in overcoming 
the challenges faced by all individuals. Value is based on the individual’s success in overcoming these 
challenges. That value of success is all the more sought if it is rewarded. Lot of variables can be used to 
test the impact of the value of success in the behavior of maturity repayment: indifference regarding 
failure, appreciation of post-contractual opportunism, etc. There are defined as economic non material 
incentives. 
In the city of “fame”, greatness is reflected in the opinion that includes self-esteem and the reputation. 
That’s the positive reputation or the looking-glass-self. An example is the fact that the more a borrower 
is motivated by self-esteem, the more he behaves in actions that are admired by those surrounding him 
and the higher is the maturity repayment. Finally, in the city of “inspiration”, value refers to the 
religious notion of beliefs. Individuals have a moral commitment to comply with the high standards of 
a virtuous lifestyle as required by religious norms.  
Some variables such us happiness/jealousy of neighborhoods, past shame experiences, etc. can be used 
to test the impact of the value of fame in the behavior of maturity repayment and marital or religious 
status are supposed to have benefic impact on the behavior of maturity repayment. All these variables 
are regarding social norms. 
The next section proposes the empirical evidences in which theoretical analyses are illustrated with 
data from a field study in a West-African microfinance institution (PAMDE) in Benin (Kamalan, 2010).  
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3. Empirical Evidence 
3.1 Data, Variables and Methods 
In that section, we’ll focused on a survey covered sample of 832 customers composed of 506 individual 
loans and 272 group loans, representative the population of 21146 in a microfinance institution called 
PADME in Cotonou (Benin). The survey includes only borrowers in process of credit. The survey was 
conducted in 2006 while PADME was considered to be one of the best microfinance institutions with 
higher repayment rate of borrowers. PADME has been selected because it gives opportunity to learn 
about the non-market institutions such as endorsement and sponsorship practices involved in lending 
contracts.  
The methods used in that section are the logit and probit models and the fractional regression model of 
Papke and Wooldridge (1996). The logit and probit models are used to study the behavior for loan 
repayment. The variable of interest is the “delays” in loan maturity repayment which takes the value 1 
if the borrower has no default in maturity repayment and takes the value 0 if at least one maturity 
repayment is defected. The explanatory variables are displayed in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Explanatory Variables 
 
The fractional model helps to understand the probability of delinquency in loan repayment. This model 
is useful for situations where the variable of interest is continuous and restricted to the interval (0, 1) 
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and is related to other variables through a regression structure (Cribari-Neto & Zeileis, 2010). With the 
fractional method, we are interested in knowing about the behavior of the delay in repayment. It seems 
like delinquency in maturity repayment. First we generate the P probability corresponding to the 
situation where there is no delay. Then, we create the variable R=1-P corresponding to the probability 
of having at least 1 delay. We generate the R variable and we estimate the fractional regression model. 
That model is generally used for beta regression where variables are greater than zero and less than one, 
such as rates, proportions and indices.  
3.2 Findings 
3.2.1 The Influencing Factors of the Maturity Repayment Behavior 
The Logit model estimate (Figure 4) shows that the factors that explain the maturity performance are: 
the indifference regarding failure, the marital status, the sponsorship, the willingness to renew the credit 
received, status and type of loan. Only significant variables are considered. These variables are 
supposed to have positive effects on repaying maturities without delay, in contrast to the type of loan 
and the marital status which have negative effects.  
The Probit model (Figure 5) is more restrictive since marital status is not significant.  
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -3.733109    1.24912    -2.99   0.003     -6.18134   -1.284878
      famsup    -.0667715   .1809356    -0.37   0.712    -.4213988    .2878558
     loantyp    -1.417239   .2424026    -5.85   0.000    -1.892339   -.9421381
     postopp     .0836893   .1841911     0.45   0.650    -.2773186    .4446973
    loanrenw     .6551918   .3318552     1.97   0.048     .0047677    1.305616
     sponsor     2.597394    .205262    12.65   0.000     2.195088    2.999701
    relistat     1.483343   1.136598     1.31   0.192    -.7443474    3.711033
    maristat    -.5697063   .2987465    -1.91   0.057    -1.155239    .0158261
     shamexp     .0664903   .2095035     0.32   0.751    -.3441291    .4771097
    indifail     .7921605   .2285467     3.47   0.001     .3442172    1.240104
    jealneig     .1379401   .3114363     0.44   0.658    -.4724639    .7483441
     hapneig      .555103   .4105596     1.35   0.176    -.2495791    1.359785
     endorse     .2079762   .2155437     0.96   0.335    -.2144817     .630434
                                                                              
      delays        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -422.92268                     Pseudo R2         =     0.2665
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(12)       =     307.24
Logistic regression                             Number of obs     =        832
 
Figure 4. Logistic Regression 
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       _cons    -2.322556   .7149657    -3.25   0.001    -3.723863   -.9212487
      famsup    -.0522041    .106517    -0.49   0.624    -.2609736    .1565655
     loantyp    -.8213902   .1377351    -5.96   0.000    -1.091346   -.5514343
     postopp     .0472681   .1081512     0.44   0.662    -.1647044    .2592406
    loanrenw     .3775101   .1964478     1.92   0.055    -.0075205    .7625408
     sponsor     1.560659   .1157665    13.48   0.000     1.333761    1.787557
    relistat     .9220995   .6420364     1.44   0.151    -.3362688    2.180468
    maristat    -.2650423    .166067    -1.60   0.110    -.5905277    .0604431
     shamexp     .0397269    .123447     0.32   0.748    -.2022247    .2816785
    indifail     .4480144   .1351276     3.32   0.001     .1831691    .7128596
    jealneig     .0733384   .1786995     0.41   0.682    -.2769062     .423583
     hapneig     .3203205   .2428238     1.32   0.187    -.1556054    .7962463
     endorse     .1392684   .1313471     1.06   0.289    -.1181672    .3967041
                                                                              
      delays        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -422.60067                     Pseudo R2         =     0.2670
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(12)       =     307.89
Probit regression                               Number of obs     =        832
 
Figure 5. Probit Regression 
 
Appendix 1 and Appendix 3 provide more details for the Logit and Probit models.  
With regard to the marginal effects after logit and probit regression, the following results can be noted: 
the probability of having no delay increases by 18.92% (Appendix 2) and 17.24% (Appendix 4) when 
moving from a borrower which is indifferent regarding failure to another one who is very embarrassed. 
Religious status concerning non-current practicing to current practicing borrower increases the 
probability of having no delay by about 30%.  
The willingness of loan renewal is also powerful in increasing the probability of having no delay by 
about 14%.  
The most powerful tool that lead borrowers to increasing the probability of having no delay is the 
sponsorship by 54.82% when moving from one borrower without sponsor to another one who is 
sponsored. Finally, we note that probability of not being late decreases by 31.84% when moving from 
joint liability group loan to individual loan. That suppose that joint liability group loans are less risky 
than individual loans. 
3.2.2 The Probability of Delinquency in Repayment Behavior 
Several factors explain the probability of having at least one delay in repayment (Figure 6). 
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       _cons      .349178   .1427209     2.45   0.014     .0694503    .6289058
      famsup     .1827017   .0518445     3.52   0.000     .0810883    .2843151
     postopp     .0068026    .053586     0.13   0.899    -.0982241    .1118293
    maristat     .2484953   .0877599     2.83   0.005     .0764891    .4205015
     shamexp      .222241   .0572201     3.88   0.000     .1100916    .3343904
    jealneig    -.3493436   .0851817    -4.10   0.000    -.5162966   -.1823905
     hapneig    -.4144738   .0913214    -4.54   0.000    -.5934605   -.2354871
     endorse     .0247069   .0489988     0.50   0.614     -.071329    .1207428
                                                                              
           R        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood =  -565.1106               Pseudo R2         =     0.0192
                                                Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(7)      =      83.48
Fractional probit regression                    Number of obs     =        832
 
Figure 6. Fractional Regression 
 
The interpretations based on the conditional mean of R predicted in Appendix 5 give the conclusions 
above. The probability of having at least one delay decreases on average about 15.98% when moving 
from a borrower who consider the neighborhood not being happy of his or her financial situation to 
another borrower whose neighborhood is qualified as being happy. The reasoning is the same with the 
jealousy neighborhood variable (13.6% reduction). For the variables (shame experience) and (marital 
status), the probability of having at least one delay increases about 8% or 9% when passing from a 
borrower who has never experienced a shameful situation to another who has already experienced a 
shameful situation; or from a not married to a married borrower. Finally, moving from borrower who 
never ask for family financial support to another who often ask for family financial support increases 
about 7.2% the probability of having at least one delay in maturity repayments. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Individual decisions concerning prosocial activates belong to the class of decisions where both 
economic incentives and social norms play a role. In this paper, we attempted to bring together social 
norms and economic incentives on an equal footing in a model of individual choice concerning 
prosocial behavior, especially related to maturity repayment. After describing an overview of 
economics and sociological theories that address the motives of individual’s prosocial behavior, we 
proposed an evidence-based sociological framework of individual’s prosocial behavior focusing on the 
justification and the economies of worth of Boltanski and Thevenot.  
This article explores the frontier of economy and sociology by questioning the very foundations of 
individual’s prosocial behavior. The study addresses the causal effect of economic incentives and social 
norms on individual moral hazard applied to maturity repayment behavior of loans. Without using 
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collateral as defined in the microeconomics of banking, we studied theoretically the effects of values 
used as the very bases of the reasoning that justify individual behaviors in various contexts. And we 
empirically tested the effects of theses values in the maturity repayment behaviors of borrowers in a 
specific context applied in Africa. We used the Logit, the Probit and the Fractional method.  
These results invite to a socioeconomic approach which indicates that economic material and 
non-material incentives and social norms known as social preferences are likely to have important 
effects on shaping of prosocial behaviors of individuals. The results indicate that the probability of 
having no delay strongly increase with the use of the practice of sponsorship. We notice that the 
practice of endorsement is non-significant for knowing about the behavior in maturity repayment. That 
help us conclude that social norms (such as religious status, indifference regarding failure) and material 
incentives (loan renewal) and non-material incentives (sponsorship) are potentially powerful to lead 
borrowers to the prosocial act of maturity repayment of loans.  
However, the logit and probit models explain only 26% of borrowers’ behaviour towards maturity 
repayments. This recommends including additional explanatory variables in our models or looking for 
alternative models such as Poisson regression analysis. 
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Appendix 1 
                  Prob > chi2 =         0.0000
            Pearson chi2(146) =       338.89
 number of covariate patterns =       159
       number of observations =       832
Logistic model for delays, goodness-of-fit test
 
                                                  
Correctly classified                        77.28%
                                                  
False - rate for classified -   Pr( D| -)   19.79%
False + rate for classified +   Pr(~D| +)   25.28%
False - rate for true D         Pr( -| D)   18.87%
False + rate for true ~D        Pr( +|~D)   26.42%
                                                  
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)   80.21%
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)   74.72%
Specificity                     Pr( -|~D)   73.58%
Sensitivity                     Pr( +| D)   81.13%
                                                  
True D defined as delays != 0
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5
   Total           408           424           832
                                                  
     -              77           312           389
     +             331           112           443
                                                  
Classified           D            ~D         Total
                       True         
Logistic model for delays
 
Appendix 2 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
                                                                              
  famsup*   -.0166407      .04511   -0.37   0.712  -.105054  .071772   .653846
 loantyp*   -.3390236      .05273   -6.43   0.000  -.442372 -.235675   .673077
 postopp*    .0208265      .04578    0.45   0.649  -.068906  .110559   .653846
loanrenw*    .1561585      .07361    2.12   0.034   .011893  .300424   .927885
 sponsor*    .5549829      .03232   17.17   0.000    .49163  .618336   .612981
relistat*    .3040212      .16111    1.89   0.059  -.011745  .619788   .990385
maristat*   -.1410714       .0721   -1.96   0.050  -.282388  .000245    .90024
 shamexp*    .0165782      .05227    0.32   0.751  -.085879  .119035   .216346
indifail*    .1892248      .05092    3.72   0.000   .089418  .289031   .813702
jealneig*    .0342094      .07681    0.45   0.656  -.116331  .184749   .894231
 hapneig*    .1332654      .09298    1.43   0.152  -.048978  .315509   .956731
 endorse*     .051812      .05364    0.97   0.334  -.053326   .15695    .41226
                                                                              
variable        dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X
                                                                              
         =  .46990806
      y  = Pr(delays) (predict)
Marginal effects after logit
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Appendix 3 
                  Prob > chi2 =         0.0000
            Pearson chi2(146) =       333.19
 number of covariate patterns =       159
       number of observations =       832
Probit model for delays, goodness-of-fit test
 
                                                  
Correctly classified                        76.68%
                                                  
False - rate for classified -   Pr( D| -)   20.36%
False + rate for classified +   Pr(~D| +)   25.90%
False - rate for true D         Pr( -| D)   19.36%
False + rate for true ~D        Pr( +|~D)   27.12%
                                                  
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)   79.64%
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)   74.10%
Specificity                     Pr( -|~D)   72.88%
Sensitivity                     Pr( +| D)   80.64%
                                                  
True D defined as delays != 0
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5
   Total           408           424           832
                                                  
     -              79           309           388
     +             329           115           444
                                                  
Classified           D            ~D         Total
                       True         
Probit model for delays
 
Appendix 4 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
                                                                              
  famsup*   -.0207464      .04235   -0.49   0.624  -.103753   .06226   .653846
 loantyp*   -.3183615      .05019   -6.34   0.000  -.416741 -.219982   .673077
 postopp*    .0187582      .04288    0.44   0.662  -.065279  .102796   .653846
loanrenw*     .144945      .07151    2.03   0.043   .004796  .285094   .927885
 sponsor*    .5482105      .03145   17.43   0.000   .486577  .609844   .612981
relistat*    .3090923      .15512    1.99   0.046    .00506  .613125   .990385
maristat*   -.1054208      .06559   -1.61   0.108  -.233969  .023128    .90024
 shamexp*    .0157929      .04911    0.32   0.748  -.080466  .112052   .216346
indifail*    .1724996      .04951    3.48   0.000   .075457  .269542   .813702
jealneig*    .0290295      .07045    0.41   0.680  -.109049  .167108   .894231
 hapneig*    .1236404      .08974    1.38   0.168  -.052243  .299524   .956731
 endorse*     .055328      .05214    1.06   0.289  -.046866  .157522    .41226
                                                                              
variable        dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X
                                                                              
         =  .46236814
      y  = Pr(delays) (predict)
Marginal effects after probit
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Appendix 5 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
                                                                              
  famsup*    .0727744       .0206    3.53   0.000   .032404  .113145   .653846
 postopp*    .0027111      .02136    0.13   0.899  -.039148   .04457   .653846
maristat*     .098741       .0345    2.86   0.004   .031114  .166368    .90024
 shamexp*    .0879557      .02241    3.93   0.000    .04404  .131871   .216346
jealneig*   -.1363622      .03209   -4.25   0.000  -.199253 -.073472   .894231
 hapneig*   -.1597509      .03332   -4.79   0.000  -.225057 -.094444   .956731
 endorse*    .0098449      .01952    0.50   0.614   -.02842   .04811    .41226
                                                                              
variable        dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X
                                                                              
         =  .51839399
      y  = Conditional mean of R (predict)
 
 
 
 
